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REVIEW ARTICLE 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST1 
by Alan Peacock and Graham Bannock 
Reviewed by John Scouller, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
The 1988 contested takeover of Rowntree by the Swiss 
corporation Nestle came in the middle of the greatest 
takeover boom in British history and at a time when 
British firms and foreign firms were buying one another 
at an unprecedented rate. For various reasons this single 
takeover caused a particular furore despite the fact that 
Nestle paid more than twice what the British 
stock-market had previously valued Rowntree. One of 
the positive benefits of the furore was that the Rowntree 
Foundation commissioned a study of the takeover 
mechanism the result of which is the text under review. 
It should be said first of all that given the limited 
resources at their disposal and the time constraint they 
faced that Alan Peacock and his associates have produced 
a creditable piece of work and a substantial contribution 
to the public debate on the issue. One has to wonder of 
course why it was that a government apparently wedded 
to the notion of competition failed to commission such a 
study itself in view of the enormous level of takeover 
activity during the late 1980's. The only serious 
government investigation of the issue was carried out in 
1978 at a time when merger activity was relatively 
quiescent and research into the issue in its infancy 
(HMSO, 1978). Because of the subsequent boom in 
research we now know a lot more about takeovers than 
we did a decade ago and the Peacock report makes good 
use of this knowledge. 
The Report follows a logical approach to the issue. First, 
it seeks to establish the facts about the scale of takeover 
activity in the UK which it does with characteristic 
thoroughness. Unfortunately space constraints mean that 
there is only a limited presentation of the statistics in the 
report itself so the interested reader will necessarily have 
to turn to the numerous research reports commissioned by 
the inquiry team. (Full details, and brief summaries, of 
all the research reports can be found in an appendix of 
the Peacock report). 
Second, the report considers the factors favouring 
takeovers in the UK concentrating in particular on the 
increasing separation between beneficial ownership of 
equity and effective control of the enterprise. (What 
Drucker has called 'pension fund socialism'). In passing 
the issues of corporate taxation and accounting 
procedures are also covered. 
Third, the report examines the consequences of the 
takeover mechanism. It considers the consequences for 
the acquiring and the acquired businesses, for the 
economy in general, for regions within the economy, and 
for what it calls the ethics of business behaviour. Central 
to this part is a lengthy but reasonably painless discussion 
of the meaning of efficient capital markets correctly 
identified as of fundamental importance to the debate. 
Finally, the report turns to the policy issue. It sets out 
current UK and EC policy, provides a substantial critique 
of current policy, and goes on to make a number of 
recommendations for improving policy. 
What we have then in an all too brief 100 pages of text 
is a logically coherent, well-written (in good 
old-fashioned English, for which much thanks), 
perceptive, thorough analysis of an issue of great 
importance to us all which is not taken nearly as 
seriously as it should be by the government. The report 
deserves to be widely read and debated and if the British 
took democracy seriously it would be. I fear, however, 
that it won't be and that its fate will be to become a 
convenient source of excellent notes for economics 
students. 
Before considering my major criticism of the report I will 
note some minor criticisms. First, the authors report that 
they knew of no studies of the relationship between 
takeover and innovation. I thought of three without much 
trouble (see references). Second, the authors sometimes 
become rather unscientific as in their argument that, 
"common observation supports the view that large 
companies which have grown by internal expansion have 
a more distinguished record (for innovation) than 
acquisitive companies". I think they may well be correct 
but for the simple reason that companies with 
opportunities to grow by innovation will naturally be less 
interested in acquisition. In any case common 
observation is simply not an acceptable standard of proof 
in these matters. Third, in their discussion of the causes 
of mergers the authors fail to distinguish between the 
underlying motivations for takeovers (why they happen) 
and their timing (when they happen).This is rather 
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important because one of the interesting characteristics of 
merger activity in Britain is its highly cyclical nature. 
We need to know why British companies spent fifteen 
times as much on acquisitions in 1989 as they spent in 
1981. The report would have benefitted greatly from a 
deeper analysis of this issue. 
Finally, the report gives serious attention to the issue of 
particular concern in Scotland, the regional impact of 
inward acquisition but becomes uncharacteristically 
opaque when discussing what to do about a trend which 
has left Scotland without a single major locally controlled 
world ranked industrial company. The authors suggest 
that regional issues are best left to regional policies, 
which is all very well until you recall that regional 
policies are about as scarce as locally controlled 
businesses these days. 
The major fault of the Report concerns its central theme 
which is stated as follows: 
"....corporate takeovers are more a symptom of the major 
defects in the working of the free market system than a 
principal instrument for ensuring that it works 
efficiently". 
The Report identifies the key issue as the increasing 
separation between ownership and control in Britain and 
the growing dominance of the financial institutions as 
shareholders. The problem with this, it is said, is that it 
makes the takeover process easier first because there are 
fewer people that a bidder has to convince to sell, and 
second because institutional shareholders are more likely 
to suffer from "short-termism" because they are under 
competitive pressure to produce good quarterly results. 
Thus rather than intervening directly to replace under 
performing managers the institutions prefer to sell out to 
another group of managers prepared to offer a price 
premium on the shares they hold. This analysis leads the 
authors of the Report to make their prime 
recommendation the removal of the strong tax bias in 
Britain in favour of saving via institutions such as 
pension funds. This will lead eventually to more 
personal ownership of companies and less of the 
"short-termism" associated with institutional ownership. 
I have two problems with this. First, whilst generally 
sympathetic with the analysis and familiar with the 
Japanese corporate system which eschews contested 
takeovers completely I am not yet wholly convinced that 
the net benefit of a system based on the takeover 
mechanism is necessarily less than one that is not. I 
would want more evidence to be as convinced as the 
authors are of their case. 
The second problem I have is that I am rather 
unconvinced that the report's prime recommendation will 
solve the problem. What I fail to see is how decreasing 
the proportion of shares held by institutions and 
increasing personal shareholding will remove the 
temptation of short-termism (i.e.selling out to a higher 
bidder). Will it make Lord Hanson's job harder if he has 
to convince a million small shareholders to sell their ICI 
shares rather than just a few pension fund managers? 
Sheer inertia apart I see no reason to believe that it will. 
Some small shareholders are remarkably loyal to "their" 
companies and hold on no matter what. But most I 
suspect are far too sensible to refuse an offer such as 
Nestle made for Rowntree, or BP made for Britoil. 
Rowntree's own employee-shareholders were reportedly 
enthusiastic about the bid which more than doubled the 
value of their holdings. And who could blame them? 
Therefore whilst the Report's prime recommendation may 
be worth pursuing for other reasons (tax neutrality), I do 
not see it as a solution to the problem of excessive 
takeover activity. Many of the Report's other 
recommendations seem sensible (improved accounting 
standards, more active institutional investors) and 
well-worth pursuing as part of a concerted effort towards 
improving the effectiveness of the corporate system. 
However the overwhelming impression I have is that the 
private interests which benefit from the continuation of 
the takeover game will make sure that the game goes on 
even if some of the rules have to be tightened at the 
margin. 
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